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Workers displaced from long-tenure jobs often have difficulty finding new employment 
and can take a substantial drop in earnings when they find reemployment. These losses 
are large and persistent, and can easily dwarf the transitory losses from the initial period 
of nonemployment. Policy response for these long-term problems has centred on 
education, training and skill development. This paper surveys and assesses a variety of 
strategies that have been employed to determine training effectiveness, using results 
from field experiments and from econometric work based on non-experimental data. 
Findings from this large research enterprise are not encouraging. Both experimental 
and non-experimental research shows that the returns to training for displaced workers 
are low, almost surely less than the (well-estimated) returns to formal schooling which 
lie in the 6-9% range. On a cost-benefit basis, the body of evidence does not show that 
training pays off for most of the displaced population. 
Alternative means to compensate the losers from economic adjustment might include 
modified or expanded EI coverage, without any necessary link to training expenditures, 
and perhaps consideration of alternative policies, such as Wage Insurance. Since 
evidence on training programs for displaced workers gives only limited promise, it is 
important to search for other creative ways to ensure that the costs of economic re-
structuring do not fall disproportionately on a narrow group. 
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Workers displaced from long-tenure jobs often have difﬁ  culty ﬁ  nding new employment 
and can take a substantial drop in earnings in the new job. Canadian evidence shows 
that displaced workers with at least ﬁ  ve years’ tenure on the old job have an average 
earnings loss of 25-30 per cent, even many years after the initial job separation. These 
losses are large and persistent; they dwarf the transitory losses from the initial period 
of nonemployment. Policy response for these long-term problems has centred on edu-
cation, training and skill development. How effective are such policies likely to be?
This turns out to be a complicated question to answer. Displaced workers differ in 
many ways, not all observable, and any one displaced worker can only be observed ei-
ther with training or without training. Policy needs to answer the counterfactual ques-
tion of what would have happened, if this particular worker had made the other choice, 
to assess the net effect of training. The paper surveys and assesses a variety of strategies 
that have been employed to determine training effectiveness, using results from ﬁ  eld 
experiments and from econometric work based on non-experimental data.
 
Unfortunately, ﬁ  ndings from this large research enterprise are not encouraging. Both 
experimental and non-experimental research shows that the returns to training for 
displaced workers are low, almost surely less than the (well-estimated) returns to for-
mal schooling which lie in the 6-9% range. On a cost-beneﬁ  t basis, the body of evidence 
does not show that training pays off for most of the displaced population.
Alternative means to compensate the losers from economic adjustment might include 
modiﬁ  ed or expanded EI coverage, without any necessary link to training expendi-
tures, and perhaps consideration of alternative policies, such as Wage Insurance. Since 
evidence on training programs for displaced workers gives only limited promise, it is 
important to search for other creative ways to ensure that the costs of economic re-
structuring do not fall disproportionately on a narrow group.The Effectiveness of 
Training for Displaced 




isplaced workers are individuals permanently laid off from a long-tenure job. Such 
workers pose a major policy challenge for three reasons. First, many face great 
difﬁ  culty ﬁ  nding a suitable new job and may experience a signiﬁ  cant jobless spell. 
Second, when re-employed, many of the displaced take a substantial earnings drop, 
relative to the old job. Third, displaced workers’ earnings losses appear very persistent in the 
months and years that follow. Aggregated over the period following a displacement, these earn-
ings losses can dwarf the initial short-term income loss from unemployment and have hence 
become the central focus of the literature on training effectiveness.
Policy response naturally begins with the EI program, the centerpiece of Canadian adjustment 
programs. However, much support provided by EI—especially EI Part I—is passive support for 
a presumed temporary spell of short-term joblessness. While important for the job search of 
a displaced worker, and while other adjustment programs such as job search assistance may 
usefully supplement basic income support, EI does not address the larger problem posed by 
substantial long-lived earnings losses. Policy to tackle such earnings deﬁ  cits is rather based 
on education, training, and skill development as means of bolstering the human capital of the 
displaced. A key issue is then the evaluation of the effectiveness of training. This forms the 
main focus of this report.
Magnitude of the Problem
The Incidence of Displacement
Although there is considerable US evidence on displacement, based largely on the biannual 
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS),1 Canadian evidence is relatively thin. Without a regular 
Canadian DWS, it is hard to track patterns and changes in the number of displaced workers 
and the nature of their experience.2 The most comprehensive Canadian evidence comes from 
Morissette et al. (2007) who use the Statistics Canada Longitudinal Worker File (LWF). These 
data integrate four administrative sources and cover 10 per cent of Canadian workers for 1983-
2002, although this time frame means that most of the job separations they study are at least a 
decade old. The age of these data is obviously an important qualiﬁ  er of the analysis’ relevance 
to the current policy debate.Mowat Centre EI Task Force 2
Deﬁ  nitions of displacement vary, with some being based on plant closures and others relying on 
mass layoffs to identify separations that are exogenous from the worker’s point of view. More-
over, results vary depending on whether the prior job tenure of the group of displaced workers 
is limited. For prime age (25-49) displaced workers, Morissette et al. ﬁ  nd that the incidence 
of permanent layoffs lies in the range 6.6-9.1 per cent for men and 3.4-5.3 per cent for women. 
Of these, about 10% were ﬁ  rm closures and about 20 per cent were layoffs linked to either 
ﬁ  rm closures or mass layoffs. On the broader layoff deﬁ  nition, these incidence rates mean that 
some 50,000 men were displaced in 2002, about one sixth of the 300,000 men laid off (for any 
reason) in that year. Analogous ﬁ  gures for women are about 23,000 displacements and 137,000 
lay-offs in 2002. An important point is the concentration of displacement within a relatively 
small group: most layoffs are not displacement.3
 
Seniority is important for the study of displacement since, as we shall see, losses rise sharply 
with prior job tenure. In terms of incidence, Morissette et al. ﬁ  nd that, on the ﬁ  rm closure 
layoff deﬁ  nition, about 10 per cent of all displacements had tenure of ﬁ  ve years or more. Such 
long tenure workers represent less than 1 in 100 of all annual layoffs.
Magnitude of the Problem
Unemployment Spells and Earnings Losses
Canada lacks clear evidence through time on the unemployment experience of displaced work-
ers following their job separations. One would like to track the distribution of unemployment 
durations, compared with that for the non-displaced unemployed, and to see the evolution of 
such policy-relevant magnitudes as the proportion of EI eligibility used and the frequency of 
EI exhaustion among the displaced. Without regular DWSs, though, the available evidence is 
thin. Campolieti (2009) presents data on the experiences of job losers, but the analysis encom-
passes a much wider group than those typically viewed as displaced. Gray and Finnie (2009a, 
2009b) use the Longitudinal Administrative Database, covering much the same time period 
as Morissette et al., and report that surprisingly few of the older displaced rely heavily on EI. 
And Bernard (2009) provides recent Canadian evidence on unemployment durations, although 
attention is not restricted to displaced workers.
 
Overall, in both Canada and the US, research on displaced workers has paid relatively little 
attention to short-term unemployment and non-employment following job separation, focus-
ing rather on earnings losses in new employment. Nonetheless, some evidence suggests that 
Canadian displaced workers face longer unemployment spells than the average for the newly 
unemployed as a whole, reﬂ  ecting their lack of familiarity with job search, potential mismatch 
of their skill sets with current labour market needs, and perhaps a reluctance to settle for lower 
wages. Both EI and job search assistance are likely of some help in cushioning this impact of 
displacement. But such transitory problems are secondary to the more enduring problem of lost 
earning potential.
Morissette et al. assess earnings losses that displaced workers experience in new employment. 
There are many permutations of sample, deﬁ  nitions of displacement and estimation method, 
but the pattern of results is quite consistent. For the high seniority group, Morissette et al. The Effectiveness of Training for Displaced Workers with Long Prior Job Tenure 3
compare earnings in year 5 after job separation with those in year 4 prior to displacement, 
calculating the change as a proportion of the pre-displacement earnings.4 The mean earnings 
drop is 25-35 per cent (men) and around 35 per cent (women) based on all displacements, and 
25-34 per cent (men) and 35-37 per cent (women) based only on displacements owing to ﬁ  rm 
closure. For displaced workers at all seniority levels, and using all displacements, the earnings 
drops are 16-22 per cent (men) and 22-31 per cent (women).5 Clearly, these are large losses ﬁ  ve 
years after a displacement.
For older workers not covered by the Morissette et al. sample aged 25-49, a complicating issue 
is the potential for self-selection out of the labour force and into (possibly early) retirement. 
Such selection would prevent potential earnings losses from being observed, although the 
resulting estimation bias could go in either direction.6 The best evidence comes from Schirle 
(2007) who models this selection process carefully. She concludes it is not empirically critical: 
older workers face potential displacement earnings losses that are similar to those experienced 
by the prime-age displaced.
In summary, the balance of Canadian evidence is that many displaced workers cannot avoid an 
earnings loss. For workers with signiﬁ  cant prior tenure, these losses are substantial. A ballpark 
ﬁ  gure from the best Canadian research would be around 25-30 per cent for those with at least 
ﬁ  ve years’ tenure, together with a ﬁ  gure of perhaps 20 per cent for displaced workers at all 
seniority levels. Such earnings losses are typically long-lived, with no sign in the data that they 
dissipate even ﬁ  ve years after the displacement.
Causes of the Problem: 
Potential for Skill Upgrading?
 
There is conclusive evidence that displaced workers typically suffer substantial and potentially 
permanent earnings losses. Does this mean that these earnings losses are the result of a skill 
deﬁ  cit?  And, as a distinct issue, would skill upgrading help displaced workers deal with these 
earnings losses? 
The causes of displacement earnings losses are probably many and varied. Human capital 
that is speciﬁ  c to a job or ﬁ  rm may grow with tenure and be associated with substantial wage 
growth, and yet be non-transferable to a new job or ﬁ  rm following displacement. Key to assess-
ing the importance of this cause is whether human capital is speciﬁ  c or general and, if speciﬁ  c, 
whether the speciﬁ  city applies at the level of the ﬁ  rm, occupation or industry. A leading 
alternative is a long-term contracting framework wherein risk-neutral ﬁ  rms provide insur-
ance against wage ﬂ  uctuation to their risk-averse workers by making wages smoother than the 
corresponding path of productivity. Similarly, incentive pay schemes may use deferred com-
pensation to overcome agency problems (related to work effort) within the ﬁ  rm. These agency 
models have low wages (under-compensation) at low tenure counterbalanced by high wages 
(and over-compensation) at high tenure levels, a pattern consistent with displaced earnings 
losses that are increasing in tenure. Finally, there are also theories of wage premia based on 
union wage effects, efﬁ  ciency wages, and models of rent-sharing.Mowat Centre EI Task Force 4
It is also important to note the considerable econometric literature that tries to disentangle 
the empirical wage-tenure relationship. In this work, the key is that wages and job tenure are 
co-determined, both resulting from workers’ and ﬁ  rms’ choices in equilibrium. Consequently, 
while a positive cross-section correlation between wages and tenure could arise from one or 
more of the above theories, it could also be spurious, driven by unobserved heterogeneity in 
worker, ﬁ  rm or worker-ﬁ  rm match type.7  
This is obviously not the place to survey this econometric work extensively. Rather, I simply 
summarize this literature by suggesting that the simple least-squares estimate from cross-
sectional data probably represents an upper bound on the true returns to tenure. If correct, this 
body of research would conclude that, while part of the displacement earnings loss could be 
attributed to a loss of a tenure-related wage premium, a substantial part of the loss would be for 
other reasons.
I now turn to the question of whether displaced workers need skills upgrading. If earnings 
reﬂ  ect accumulated skills (with some ﬁ  rm or industry speciﬁ  city) that are lost on displacement, 
then skill upgrading and replacement is a natural policy response.  A thornier issue arises 
when lost speciﬁ  c human capital is not the main reason for earnings deﬁ  cits. What if the earn-
ings drop after displacement is due to long-term contracting reasons, such as deferred com-
pensation, or industry-speciﬁ  c rents, or even a loss of a premium unionized job?  Is there an 
argument that an upward-sloping wage proﬁ  le for incentive reasons constitutes a “valid” cause 
of a pre-displacement wage premium, while a union rent does not?  I have three comments.
First, it is hard to determine the cause of a pre-displacement earnings premium for any indi-
vidual displaced worker. This parallels the practical, empirical difﬁ  culties many have encoun-
tered in attempting to identify the cause of displacement (trade, technical change, shifting ﬁ  nal 
product demand). 
Second, pragmatic policy might aim to compensate the losers from adjustment, regardless of 
the cause. Such compensation garners political support for policies that favour change, dyna-
mism and economic growth, the argument being that, while the beneﬁ  ts of economic adjust-
ment may be widespread, the costs of adjustment may narrowly be borne by a few. That said, 
a clear case where policy might economize on compensation costs is where pre-displacement 
earnings were unusually high for transitory reasons. Compensatory policy focused on long 
tenure displaced workers would naturally achieve this goal.
Third, does it then follow that the best mitigating policy should be to promote skills upgrad-
ing?  There are comparatively few other policy levers that can raise post-displacement wages, 
although perhaps job search assistance can help secure better worker-ﬁ  rm matches without 
directly augmenting skills. But I think the answer to this question must be contingent, based on 
empirical evidence about effectiveness and efﬁ  ciency of investments in skills. If the displaced 
were essentially unable to learn new skills to a level that paid off in terms of higher earnings, 
say, then perhaps some other form of compensation policy would be more suitable. But if there 
were a sufﬁ  cient payoff to training and the acquisition of skills, then skill upgrading could help 
compensate the displaced. The effectiveness of training for this population is key.The Effectiveness of Training for Displaced Workers with Long Prior Job Tenure 5
Training
Private and Social Returns 
The private gain from training may exceed the social beneﬁ  t, particularly in cases of 
substitution, whereby trainees beneﬁ  t from jobs that they compete away from non-trainees. 
Trainees could displace non-trainees, and “displacement” is very much the mot juste. With 
many data sources, it may be hard to assess the importance of this effect without direct 
evidence on the labour market outcomes of non-trainees. General equilibrium effects could 
undo apparent training rewards but it might be hard for the analyst to discern.
Substitution may also be relevant for job search assistance. If their employment-related ser-
vices genuinely improve match quality, then a worker’s private gain might be mirrored by a 
social gain ﬂ  owing from enhanced productivity. But if the private beneﬁ  ts of job search assis-
tance derive mostly from outcompeting those without such assistance—without a concomitant 
increase in productivity—then the private beneﬁ  ts of job search assistance could mask little or 
no social return.8
Training
Barriers to Private Provision?
The case for public provision of training for long-tenure displaced workers also depends on an 
elaboration of the barriers to private provision. Credit constraints and other imperfections in 
capital markets, speciﬁ  cally the inability of individuals to borrow against future labour income, 
are often thought relevant to an explanation of the distribution of education achievements 
by income level. However, the evidence for credit constraints remains indirect and disputed, 
especially as higher family income can also improve the household environment conducive to 
the growth of cognitive and non-cognitive skills for education. Indeed, Carneiro and Heckman 
(2002) conclude that teenage ability far outweighs family income as a determinant of participa-
tion in post-secondary education. This opens up a voluminous literature of which a reasonable 
summary might be that the importance of credit constraints for human capital choices remains 
much disputed.9 
With regard to displaced workers, self-ﬁ  nanced training in particular may be subject to credit 
constraints and some aspects of public policy appear to be structured in light of this.10 But 
again the evidence is mixed. Chapman et al. (2003) use the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment 
Panel (COEP) to examine self-ﬁ  nanced training among job losers and suggest that liquidity 
does affect these choices. Yet they also note that credit constraints are not reported as the main 
reason why the COEP job losers do not undergo self-ﬁ  nanced training. The extent that training 
is rationed owing to credit constraints remains an open issue.
Public intervention in training could also have a role even absent credit constraints, provided 
the private outcome involves equilibrium underprovision of training. Such non-optimality can 
arise for several reasons. Wage compression (for institutional or legal reasons) may prevent 
workers from “paying for training” by accepting low initial wages: a minimum wage might 
thus discourage appropriate provision of training. Empirically, though, most evidence from Mowat Centre EI Task Force 6
the US and Canada suggests that this effect is small. Other types of wage compression, relative 
to marginal products, can also generate potential suboptimality of private training (Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1998, 1999, 2003). Examples would include imperfect labour markets, transac-
tion costs, asymmetric information, contracting reasons relating to the eliciting of effort and 
diligence, and the interaction of general and speciﬁ  c skills. To give one example, “poaching” 
threats may make ﬁ  rms wary of too much investment in their workforce for fear of losing 
skilled workers to competitors. Asymmetric information may make it hard for workers credibly 
to signal that they have useful general skills to other employers, since the current employer 
may wish to keep such productivity information private, and this in turn produces suboptimal 
incentives for skill investments. 
 
Two points on the optimality of private training bear emphasis. First, proponents of these non-
competitive models of training with wage compression do not have speciﬁ  c recommendations 
to offer: “…we currently lack the type of detailed empirical information necessary to make pre-
cise policy recommendations” (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, pF128). Second, if inefﬁ  ciencies in 
training arise for non-credit market reasons, the ﬁ  x is probably not a program of loans. Indeed, 
attempts to solve non-credit problems by credit market subsidies could be counter-productive, 
perhaps generating overinvestment. Understanding the origins of suboptimal training invest-
ments is a prerequisite for knowing how to ﬁ  x the problem.
Issues in the Evaluation of Training 
Methodologies
A large and developed literature exists on the economics and econometrics of active labour 
market programs, particularly training schemes, and research in this area can rightfully be 
regarded as at the forefront in the development of techniques for empirical program evalua-
tion. Methodological issues fundamental to the assessment of causation, and to the separation 
of program impacts from program outcomes, are comprehensively assessed in Heckman et al. 
(1999) and more recently in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
The fundamental problem in an assessment of causation is that, for a given individual, one can 
only observe the effect with treatment or the effect without treatment.11 The counterfactual of 
what would have happened to a treated individual, had they not received the treatment, is un-
observed. Comparison of the treated and the untreated may offer insight but is problematic if 
the treatment itself is endogenous: one group may self-select into treatment (training) and this 
self-selection may be associated with different characteristics than for the group that did not 
self-select. Individuals may also be selected into treatment by program administrators, perhaps 
in a well-meaning effort to help those in greatest need, or perhaps by selecting those most likely 
to succeed (“creaming”). If differences between the groups inﬂ  uence response to treatment, 
the untreated group may be a poor proxy for the true counterfactual. To tackle these problems 
using nonexperimental data, research methodologies have included instrumental variables, 
panel data estimates, selection-correction models and more recently matching and regression 
discontinuity estimators.The Effectiveness of Training for Displaced Workers with Long Prior Job Tenure 7
The major alternative in program evaluation is to use experimental data where assignment 
to treatment is random (independent of observed individual characteristics and potential 
outcomes). For some problems, experimentation can yield good estimates of the counterfac-
tual and hence more reliable estimates of program impact. In the speciﬁ  c context of training, 
LaLonde’s inﬂ  uential paper (1986) showed that a variety of econometric methods, applied to 
data drawn from a true experiment, were unable to match results from the randomized experi-
ment itself.
Subsequent work has improved on these methods, however, and many have argued that ran-
domized social experimentation may deliver answers only to very speciﬁ  c questions, such as 
the mean difference between two groups (Heckman, 1991). When labour market interventions 
are multi-stage, the scope for clean experimental evaluation may be limited.12 “Randomization 
bias” may contaminate experimental results: the behaviour of potential participants may be 
altered by the random assignment itself, perhaps by selection on risk aversion. Further, experi-
ments are undoubtedly expensive and may pose signiﬁ  cant practical, political, technological 
or ethical problems. Finally, experimental estimates usually reﬂ  ect a partial equilibrium effect 
of an intervention. If treatment confers an advantage in employment prospects, say, a positive 
partial effect for the treated may or may not be at the expense of employment of the untreated 
control group, depending on the extent of displacement or substitution of non-trainees.13 
Overall, I remain agnostic in the debate about experimental and nonexperimental methods and 
results. Although random assignment does not solve all problems, it has at times yielded more 
robust and credible estimates than were possible from nonexperimental data alone. Moreover, 
it has generated advances in statistical and econometric methods to deal with problems arising 
from such nonexperimental data.14 
Effectiveness of Training Programs for Displaced 
Workers 
 
Most of the voluminous literature on training program effectiveness, based on US evidence, has 
studied disadvantaged populations with few skills, checkered attachment to the labour market, 
and generally poor wage and employment prospects. Lessons from such a population do not ap-
ply directly to a population of Canadian displaced workers that exhibits past strong attachment 
to the labour market, evidenced particularly in long tenure and strong earnings on the old job. 
Accordingly, I will restrict my review of empirical results almost completely to research based 
on samples of displaced workers.15 Moreover, I follow the training literature in a focus on long-
term outcomes, speciﬁ  cally earnings replacement and recovery following displacement. This 
contrasts with attention to short-term re-employment outcomes, about which there has been 
less research. This longer-term focus reﬂ  ects the greater overall importance of earnings chang-
es over subsequent years and decades, relative to the transitory costs of initial joblessness.16 
 
Important results on training effectiveness for the displaced fall into four groups. First, I 
review ﬁ  ndings from (experimental) evaluations of displaced worker programs conducted in 
the US in the late 1980s, including demonstration projects in Buffalo, Texas and New Jersey 
(Leigh, 1990, 1994). Second, there are credible nonexperimental studies of the effect of com-
munity college courses on displaced workers based on administrative records from Washington Mowat Centre EI Task Force 8
State (Jacobson et al., 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Third, I assess some preliminary results for the US 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), legislation that replaced the Job Training Partnership Act 
in 1998 (Hollenbeck et al., 2005; Heinrich et al., 2009; and Decker 2009). Finally, I review the 
small Canadian literature on the effectiveness of training in light of the international evidence.
Dislocated Worker Demonstration Projects
 
The US Department of Labor’s Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project began in October 
1982 to study measures to aid the adjustment of workers displaced from manufacturing. It fol-
lowed the Downriver program in Denver which had studied service delivery for the displaced 
following closing of an auto part plant in August 1980. Although the Downriver program used 
treatment and comparison groups, workers were not randomly assigned on an individual basis; 
rather, plants were determined to be treatment or comparison plants, and workers were then 
selected at random from within these plants. The assignment by plant casts doubt on the posi-
tive results on earnings found in some Downriver programs (Leigh, 1990).
 
Although there were seven sites involved in the Dislocated Worker Demonstration Project, the 
chief impact analysis was conﬁ  ned to Buffalo. The “target plant” sample in Buffalo was drawn 
from workers laid off from six steel and auto plants in the 12 months starting October 1982, 
the sample being male, white and married and with average prior job tenure of more than ten 
years: most had experienced a lengthy period of unemployment prior to the Project. A formal 
lottery generated random assignment to available program slots and resulted in 281 treated and 
516 controls. The treatment consisted of job search assistance (JSA) with a possible follow-up 
of either classroom training (CT) or on-the-job training (OJT). Leigh notes (1990, p30) that the 
CT in Buffalo was typically very short-duration, while the OJT was chieﬂ  y a placement tool 
involving an employer wage subsidy. Some 55 per cent of participants received neither CT nor 
OJT.
 
The Buffalo Demonstration Project showed an impact on average weekly earnings of $134 from 
JSA alone for the target plant sample, an effect that is statistically signiﬁ  cant (5 per cent level) 
and economically important (Leigh, 1990, Table 3.3). With a mean prior wage of $10.78, this 
earnings impact was substantial, being about 28 per cent of pre-layoff earnings (based on a 40 
hour week). However, there were no signiﬁ  cant effects of supplementing this with either CT or 
OJT. Since Leigh reports that average costs per participant were $851 for JSA compared with 
$3282 for CT+JSA and $3170 for OJT+JSA, a conclusion from the Buffalo results is that the 
only potentially cost effective treatment was JSA.
 
An important limitation of the Buffalo Demonstration Project stems from the construction of 
the treatment and control groups. Speciﬁ  cally, individuals who were randomly assigned for 
treatment but chose not to participate were included as members of the comparison group. 
This creates a difﬁ  cult self-selection problem that undermines random assignment. Moreover, 
the participation rate among recruited target-plant workers was only 16 per cent (Leigh, 1990, 
p27), so this selection was quantitatively important. Although efforts were made to model indi-
vidual participation decisions, including a selectivity variable in the ﬁ  nal outcome speciﬁ  cation 
(Corson et al., 1985), difﬁ  culties with exclusion and other identiﬁ  cation restrictions mean that 
such results lack the credibility of those from the initial random assignment design.The Effectiveness of Training for Displaced Workers with Long Prior Job Tenure 9
Results for a broader range of displaced workers were provided by the Texas Worker Adjust-
ment Demonstration (WAD). The two main sites were Houston, where the displaced were 
mostly male petrochemical workers with relatively high prior earnings, and El Paso, where 
mostly female Hispanic workers had been displaced from low-paying jobs in light manufactur-
ing. Under the WAD, individuals were randomly assigned to three groups: JSA (termed “Tier 
I” in the WAD evaluation), JSA+training (termed “Tier I/II”), and no treatment (beyond other 
services available in the community). Unlike the Buffalo Demonstration Project, recruited non-
participants were not included in the control group. Further, unlike Buffalo, the participation 
rate under the WAD was fairly high, with 71 per cent of those assigned to a treatment group 
choosing to participate (Leigh 1990: 32).
 
Results show some overall increase in annual earnings and weeks worked for the treated, with a 
substantial difference along gender/location lines. While men in both Houston and El Paso had 
short-term (annual) earnings impacts of $750 and $770, neither was statistically signiﬁ  cantly 
different from zero. In contrast, the women in El Paso had a program-induced gain in earnings 
of $1070, a large and statistically signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  gure.17 Analysis of the time-frame of earning gains, 
though, suggests that much of this female impact was very short-lived (Leigh, 1990: Table 3.4). 
 
The relative performance of JSA and training can be assessed using the WAD only for the 
Houston site, and only for men. Overall, the Tier I package of JSA yielded an earnings impact 
of $860, while the augmented Tier I/II combination of JSA+training yielded an impact of $680 
(Leigh, 1990: Table 3.5). Thus, the net effect of the augmentation of JSA with training appears 
to be negative. Two interpretations were proposed: ﬁ  rst, that skill training takes time, so that 
serious job search may wait until training is completed, which could result in poor short-term 
earnings impacts; and second, that the training offered, mainly CT in skilled manual trades (e.g. 
air conditioning installation and maintenance), was poorly matched to the nature of the Hous-
ton target group, who were largely white-collar workers laid off from high paying petrochemi-
cal jobs. While both interpretations probably have some merit, the latter was judged critical 
by the authors of the initial evaluation and highlights the key role of the match of training to 
workers’ characteristics and to labour market demand conditions. Whatever the reasons for the 
negative return to training beyond JSA, though, the results are in line with the Buffalo evi-
dence. With average costs of $1531 for Tier I (JSA) and $4991 for Tier I/II, and with no appar-
ent beneﬁ  ts from the more costly treatment, only JSA might be justiﬁ  ed on a cost-beneﬁ  t basis 
by these data. Whether training better matched to the clientele would yield greater beneﬁ  ts, 
and whether these beneﬁ  ts could cover the cost of such provision of training, are not questions 
that the WAD evaluation can answer.
 
The third major demonstration project conducted in the 1980s was the New Jersey Unemploy-
ment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration that ran in 1986-87. Like the Texas WAD, it had 
the aim of evaluating an on-going system, rather than of assessing a one-time crisis interven-
tion, but unlike the WAD, it also offered some advantage in the length of the follow-up period 
available for analysis. The intake group was targeted to be UI claimants with at least three years 
of prior job tenure and the NJ Demonstration used several screens after four weeks of beneﬁ  t 
claim to ﬁ  lter out unemployed who did not qualify as displaced. Random assignment was 
implemented in week ﬁ  ve of beneﬁ  t claim following a (mandatory) job search workshop and a 
counseling/assessment session, and amounted to one of three treatments: JSA only, JSA+CT/
OJT (subject to some conditions on chosen training schemes), and JSA+Reemployment Bonus. Mowat Centre EI Task Force 10
Training was here limited to upgrading existing skill sets, rather than learning an entirely new 
profession. The bonus treatment was a payment directly to the claimant of 50 per cent of the 
remaining UI entitlement if lasting full-time reemployment was achieved within two weeks 
of the bonus treatment offer, with a schedule that reduced the bonus by 10 per cent each week 
(and reaching zero 11 weeks after the offer).
Results from the NJ Demonstration imply an earnings impact in the quarter following the 
initial UI claim of $160 for the JSA+bonus group, compared with $125 for JSA alone and $82 
for the JSA+training group, with the ﬁ  rst two impacts being statistically signiﬁ  cant (Leigh, 
1990: Table 3.7). All three ﬁ  gures rose in the second quarter but declined substantially by four 
quarters after the UI claim and were insigniﬁ  cantly different from zero. The effects of these 
initiatives seem to be quite transitory. Moreover, longer-term follow-up over the subsequent 
six years conﬁ  rmed that those randomly assigned to the offer of retraining did no better than 
those assigned to receive only JSA (Corson and Haimson 1995). However, it should be noted 
that, among the group assigned to JSA+training, only 15 per cent actually engaged in training, 
pointing out the role of take-up as well as the initial assignment.18
 
Overall, although random assignment and the demonstration project structure offered promise, 
ﬁ  rm conclusions from the various dislocated worker demonstration projects remain limited. 
Design issues, low take-up and the speciﬁ  city of many of the sample populations have restricted 
the lessons that can be learned. The best summary is that these demonstrations found small 
positive effects of job search assistance, probably large enough to merit provision based on 
cost-beneﬁ  t analysis. However, the demonstrations found uniformly small effects, sometimes 
negative, for training programs beyond basic job search assistance, and a robust conclusion is 
that these more expensive programs could not meet a simple cost-beneﬁ  t test. 
Nonexperimental Studies of Displaced Worker programs
There are evident limits to the questions that can be resolved directly from the demonstration 
evidence, at least without the addition of important additional statistical assumptions and 
econometric modeling. Moreover, with small and often distinctive (non-representative) sam-
ples, the external validity of the demonstration results is open to question. Finally, the follow-
up period to study dynamics following an intervention is often very short. As a consequence, 
research has also used nonexperimental data to study the effects of existing training schemes 
and other policies for the displaced. Key issues in this research are how to control for differ-
ences between trainees and non-trainees, both along observed dimensions and also allowing 
appropriately for unobserved heterogeneity.
A leading example of such research is the analysis of administrative data on Community Col-
lege training in Washington State conducted by Jacobson et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Using a 
threshold of three years’ prior tenure, Jacobson et al. study some 97,000 cases of displacement 
with separations between 1990 and 1994.19 Of these, about 16 per cent had earned at least one 
Community College credit by the end of 1996. Importantly, substantial federal funding for dis-
placed worker retraining had not yet been implemented so that most of the Community College 
courses taken in the 1990-94 Washington State sample were self-ﬁ  nanced. Comparing trainees 
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other displaced workers, had somewhat lower job tenure (in line with the age difference), were 
more likely female and somewhat more likely to be rural. Interestingly, they also note that 
participants were substantially more likely than non-participants to have attended Community 
College in the past.
Overall, these Community College participants complete an average of two-thirds of a year of 
schooling. To evaluate the effects, Jacobson et al. employ two models, together with a hybrid 
combination of the two. The ﬁ  rst model is a binary program evaluation approach, comparing 
adjusted post-program earnings of Community College participants and non-participants. The 
adjustment amounts to a regression on observed characteristics, plus allowance for unobserved 
characteristics that are ﬁ  xed or that change at a steady rate (based on individual earnings 
growth in the pre-displacement period). The second model estimates a return to Community 
College that is assumed to be proportional to the credits earned. Given strong enough propor-
tionality assumptions, one could estimate a return to Community College credits using only 
participants, although there would be valuable further information in the earnings data from 
the non-participants.20
The hybrid approach used by Jacobson et al. builds on the proportionality model but allows for 
a further discrete effect of any Community College participation (as in the binary framework). 
Perhaps the beneﬁ  ts of Community College are strongly non-proportional, based on network-
ing contacts quickly acquired at College. Or perhaps the unobserved heterogeneity is not fully 
captured by the adjustment Jacobson et al. are able to make based on past earnings. In some 
cases of this type, the hybrid model may correctly estimate the return to Community College 
credits when either of the two preceding models would be biased.
Jacobson et al. allow for a distinctive pattern of displacement effects on earnings through time, 
with a potential dip prior to displacement, a more substantial drop in the quarter after the 
separation, and a relatively rapid rise in the next few quarters, followed ﬁ  nally by slow to zero 
increase thereafter. Further, they allow for dynamic effects after Community College training, 
with a potential transition period after Community College ends (a period when earnings often 
fall initially), followed by a period of potential growth in the year or more thereafter. In terms 
of the sample size, the quality and accuracy of the administrative data, and the resultant capac-
ity for ﬂ  exibility in the econometric modeling, the papers by JLS make an important contribu-
tion.
Estimation allowing for a transition period after Community College yields a long-run posi-
tive effect of schooling of 9.3 per cent of post-displacement earnings for men and 7.6 per cent 
for women, both under the binary speciﬁ  cation (Jacobson et al., 2005c: Table 2, p285). When 
estimated assuming proportionality, analogous estimates of the impact on earnings are 11.7 per 
cent for men and 10.4 per cent for women. For both cases, estimated effects immediately after 
Community College are negative, with the effects becoming positive several quarters after the 
end of the courses. Both sets of returns are substantial, perhaps slightly higher than generally 
accepted estimates of the return to formal schooling (in the 6-9 per cent range, as in, e.g., Card, 
1999).21 These ﬁ  gures represent the strongest set of non-experimental results for proponents of 
training for the displaced.
In the richer hybrid model, JLS ﬁ  nd high estimates of the value of “just showing up” since this 
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While this could be a networking-type effect, Jacobson et al.’s preferred interpretation is that 
its magnitude indicates residual selection into training. Observed controls may not be capturing 
all of the individual heterogeneity in factors such as motivation and dynamism, and remaining 
differences may be reﬂ  ected in more motivated individuals being more likely to enroll for Com-
munity College training.22 
When earnings time trends are also included as controls, in addition to ﬁ  xed effects, the pattern 
of results remain fairly consistent but the level of returns tends to rise (Jacobson et al., 2005c: 
Table 3). In the most general speciﬁ  cation, the return to a year of Community College training 
represents an earnings gain (as a percentage of post-displacement earnings) of 9.4 per cent for 
men and 13.1 per cent for women. Jacobson et al. interpret the rise in the estimated returns 
when worker-speciﬁ  c time trends are included as a form of compensation in the enrolment 
decisions of workers: those with relatively slower prior earnings growth tend to self-select into 
more courses as a means to compensate for their slower earnings path. Naturally, allowance for 
this type of selection raises the estimated effect of training.
A further important contribution of Jacobson et al. concerns course content. Speciﬁ  cally, they 
aggregate courses into two groups: “Group 1” comprises academic courses in mathematics and 
science, together with more vocational courses related to technical trades, technical profes-
sions and health; and “Group 2” comprises all other Community College courses, notably 
academic courses in the humanities and social sciences, and vocational courses in less technical 
ﬁ  elds. Results (Jacobson et al., 2005c: Table 5) from a variety of speciﬁ  cations show that the 
Group 1 courses have much larger impacts than those from Group 2. Indeed, in their preferred 
model, JLS estimate earnings gains from a year of Group 1 credits to be nearly 14 per cent (of 
post-displacement earnings) for men and a staggering 29 per cent for women. However, the 
analogous estimates for Group 2 credits are around 4 per cent but with standard errors large 
enough that they cannot reject the null hypothesis of no earnings effect whatsoever. These 
gains can be decomposed into about one third wage gains following Group 1 courses with the 
remainder being a consequence of increased work hours.
The age pattern of Community College enrolment and returns in JLS is also worth noting. 
Older men and women are both much less likely to enroll or to complete at least one course 
than the younger displaced, and they also record a lower average number of credits completed. 
This is standard in models of age and schooling, since the older have fewer years remaining to 
reap the beneﬁ  ts of education, may have higher foregone earnings costs, and may ﬁ  nd school-
ing harder after a longer period out of the classroom. However, the completion probability for 
at least one credit (conditional on Community College enrolment) is not age-dependent, and 
the number of credits earned, given some completion, is also ﬂ  at across the age distribution. It 
seems to be choices about enrolment, not success rates for enrollees, which govern the overall 
age difference in Community College training completion.23 
The evidence from Jacobson et al. is probably the best available nonexperimental source on 
the effects of training for displaced workers and it does offer some promise of success, at least 
for the right type of course. That said, there are limitations and it is important to keep these 
in mind when evaluating results for policy purposes. First, Jacobson et al. are rightly cautious 
about the size of the “just showing up” effect in their hybrid model, deeming such estimates as 
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credit are probably a sign of self-selection into training that has not been fully accounted for in 
the model speciﬁ  cation. Second, Jacobson et al. follow Ashenfelter’s (1978) analysis of the Man-
power Development and Training Act, speciﬁ  cally his speciﬁ  cation test based on “backcasting”, 
which estimates whether training appears to have effects before it actually occurs. In a variety 
of speciﬁ  cations, (Jacobson et al., 2005c, Table 7; and JLS, 2005b, Table 4), Jacobson et al. ﬁ  nd 
that participation in Community College schooling predicts earnings prior to enrolment, a 
clear ﬂ  ag suggesting model misspeciﬁ  cation. It is hard to sign the bias likely indicated by this, 
however, since it depends on the potential persistence of the unobserved factors beyond the 
ﬁ  xed effects and the worker-speciﬁ  c time trends. Participation in Community College retrain-
ing tended to be high for workers with unusually large unexplained earnings drops between the 
pre- and post-displacement periods. If these drops were temporary—a phenomenon dubbed 
“Ashenfelter’s Dip” in the literature (Ashenfelter, 1978)—then estimated returns to Commu-
nity College are likely too large, while if they reﬂ  ect permanent losses from displacement, the 
estimated returns to Community College are probably an underestimate of the true value.
Finally, it bears emphasis that the Jacobson et al. results are only directly applicable to the set 
of displaced workers studied who chose to participate in Community College training, even 
if all of the other issues surrounding nonexperimental data are correctly handled. The results 
would not apply directly to displaced workers in Washington State at this time who chose not 
to participate. They would also not apply directly to the hypothetical set of workers who might 
be induced to participate if, say, public policy had offered enhanced subsidies to the cost of 
Community College education. Since hours changes appear to drive a majority of the earn-
ings gain impacts from the Group 1 courses, there may also be suspicions about substitution, 
with trainees potentially replacing other workers so that the partial equilibrium effects might 
exceed the general equilibrium outcome.24 And of course the broader external validity of the es-
timated results must remain. We do not know how well the results would apply in other places 
and at other times.
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Results
The most recent US evaluation results on training effectiveness derive from the WIA of 1998. 
The goal of the WIA was to replace the piecemeal system of training programs under the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) with a uniﬁ  ed and consolidated system that nonetheless gave 
local and state agencies ﬂ  exibility in program design and promoted client choice. The WIA 
program currently serves over 2 million people, costs over $3Bn annually, and has three key ele-
ments: an adult program, a youth program, and a dislocated worker program. The ﬁ  rst two of 
these elements are targeted largely at the disadvantaged, so it is the dislocated worker program 
that is our main focus. Decker (2009) provides a valuable overview of the ﬁ  rst decade of the 
WIA.25 
To date, no large scale experimental evaluations have been conducted on the effects of the 
WIA on dislocated workers. However, two substantial studies have assessed these effects using 
nonexperimental data and methods. Heinrich et al. (2009) use matching estimation methods 
to assess the effects of WIA services (as a package) and WIA training (as a speciﬁ  c component) 
for dislocated workers, ﬁ  nding very disappointing results. Initial effects on earnings are nega-
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modest improvement even three or four years out (2009: Table VI.1). Indeed, they conclude 
that “it appears possible that ultimate gains from participation are small or nonexistent” (2009: 
p58, emphasis added). By demographics, they found somewhat worse performance for men 
than women but little other variation by race, age and veteran status, possibly because sample 
sizes were quite small for these sub-groups.
The other study of the WIA’s effects on dislocated workers’ earnings (Hollenbeck et al., 2005) 
seems contradictory, since it suggests positive impact estimates of $1008 per quarter for men 
and $895 for women, with the largest effects occurring immediately. However, Decker (2009) 
notes that Hollenbeck’s methodology uses the program exit point as the start of the observation 
period so that any earnings foregone during WIA program participation is essentially ignored 
in the calculation of a return. Once this methodological difference is amended, Decker suggests 
that the two papers are in fact fairly consistent. When direct and opportunity costs of WIA 
services are included, Decker argues that Hollenbeck’s results on earnings impacts show a 
substantially negative return to WIA.26 
In closing, I note that both sets of authors remain somewhat tentative about the nonexperi-
mental results from the WIA, a viewpoint reinforced by Decker’s (2009) overview. Until an 
evaluation with some random assignment is conducted, as with the US Demonstration Pro-
grams on the 1980s, doubts will remain that results reﬂ  ect as much on the sensitivities of the 
methodology as on the nature of the underlying WIA-induced outcomes.
Canadian Evidence on Adjustment Policies
Finally, I comment on assessments of Canadian adjustment policies. A valuable account of the 
various Federal Targeted Programs for this type of population is provided in the Expert Panel 
on Older Workers (2008: Table 1, p20).27 Most such programs were short-lived and aimed at 
narrowly deﬁ  ned groups, particularly those affected by the restructuring of the ﬁ  shing industry, 
and insofar as the programs were formally evaluated, the outcomes were quite discouraging.28  
Such programs were discontinued in 1998, in view of this perceived lack of success, although a 
number of alternative pilots have been tried. In October 2006, the Targeted Initiative for Older 
Workers (TIOW) was launched, and the TIOW is currently funded to March 2012, aiding the 
adjustment of workers aged 55-64. I know of no extant evaluation of the TIOW, nor whether 
one is planned.
There is some recent unpublished Canadian research that has looked at self-ﬁ  nanced train-
ing and its effects. Frenette et al. (2010) identify training by exploiting the tuition credits and 
education deductions present in the T1 tax ﬁ  les that comprise part of the LWF. Such credits 
indicate some self-ﬁ  nanced training within the calendar year covered by the T1 form, includ-
ing the count of months for which an education deduction is claimed, although for technical 
reasons they adopt a binary indicator of training uptake (rather than a proportion of the year). 
Note that this training must be limited to postsecondary education and that the tax data cap-
tures attendance rather than completion. Methodologically, Frenette et al. model selection into 
the treatment (i.e., into postsecondary attendance) using a latent variable that depends on the 
distance between the individual’s home and the closest postsecondary institution. This distance 
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ing assumption (exclusion restriction) is that this distance measure does not affect the returns 
to postsecondary education, given the selection process.
In preliminary results for those aged 25-44 in 1997, Frenette et al. ﬁ  nd evidence of positive 
selection into postsecondary education. Controlling for this selection, there remain substantial 
effects from postsecondary education on earnings. For men, on a base of approximately $30000 
in paid earnings in 1997 (all ﬁ  gures in 2007 dollars), estimated effects of formal training on 
earnings rise through time and peak nine years post-displacement at an earnings gain of $6400. 
Analogous ﬁ  gures for women, on a $20000 base, the peak effect comes with a $7100 earnings 
gain after ﬁ  ve years. There are obviously very large effects, relative to the literature, and war-
rant further investigation. That said, it is worth noting that Frenette et al. ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  cant 
effects for men aged 35-44 (the older part of their sample), so there are potentially interesting 
differences across demographic groups. 
Finally, despite these apparent beneﬁ  ts, Frenette et al. report that the take-up rate is very low 
for men, even among the younger group that appears to beneﬁ  t the more. Take-up following 
displacement is larger for women, both young and older. It remains puzzling why men appear 
so reluctant to pursue this nominally beneﬁ  cial training. One possibility is that the geographic 
controls do not truly control for selection into formal training (i.e., the identifying assump-
tion is not valid) and that the returns to training are overstated by results from the sample of 
displaced workers who choose to pursue postsecondary education. It will be interesting to see 
future work using these data and methods.
Another set of unpublished work concerns a variety of active labour market measures imple-
mented by Emploi-Quebec (SOM, 2003, 2006) using both federal funds from the Canada-
Quebec Labour Market Development Agreement and provincial funds in supplement. Speciﬁ  -
cally, the focus was on training, wage subsidies and active counselling as means to facilitate 
transition back to employment and to enhance earnings on the new job. On some readings, this 
work has been interpreted as a counter-example to the broad sweep of conclusions from North 
American research on the efﬁ  cacy of active labour market measures.
It is difﬁ  cult to evaluate research that has not been subject to peer review and published in 
standard outlets, partly because documentation of the research design and assessment of the 
conclusions may be incomplete. In the case of these Quebec studies, the voluminous unpub-
lished reports do furnish some documentation, however, and highlight two key points. 
First, the authors were aware of a number of selection-related biases in estimation (e.g., SOM, 
2003, pp8-9). Nonetheless, the underlying design remained one where, relative to a treatment 
group whose members received active measures, the control group was comprised of eligible 
individuals who did not participate in these programs. Clearly, individual choices to participate 
would therefore affect membership in the treatment/control group and a fundamental self-
selection bias is unavoidable. As such, it is probably incorrect to term such a research design 
“quasi-experimental” (a term ﬁ  rst used on page 246 of the 2003 report), since there was no 
plausibly exogenous variation that generated assignment into treatment and control groups.
Second, the report nonetheless attempted to address selection bias, both by using propensity 
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For both, predicted probabilities of participation in active measures are used to separate the 
treatment and control groups, so the estimation results hinge on the quality of these predic-
tions. The report (SOM, 2003, p9) documents that these predictions were based on personal 
demographics, job characteristics, and utilization patterns of EI in the pre-participation period. 
While it is hard to know what more could have been done, absent a truly experimental or 
quasi-experimental design, none of these proposed instruments seems unrelated to the likely 
outcomes of the active measures. Therefore, the exclusion restriction required of a valid instru-
ment would fail and the estimates raise issues of credibility that haunt evaluations without 
random assignment.
Summary of Evidence on Training Effectiveness 
 
Overall, my summary assessment is that most training programs have had results on earnings 
that are modest to poor. There has been less work on initial re-employment after displacement, 
probably because these costs are small relative to the long-term cost of earnings losses. None-
theless, to the extent that short-term results are a key policy target, the long-term focus of the 
existing literature could constitute something of a mismatch of evaluative resources.
 
Since there are few experimental evaluations for displaced workers, results are necessarily 
thin, but based on these evaluations and available nonexperimental studies, conclusions on 
effectiveness are mixed and perhaps inconclusive, at best. It is not clear that past training for 
displaced workers has paid off as an investment. Moreover, even if returns to training were 
signiﬁ  cantly positive—which is probably an over-optimistic assessment—on the order of the 
return to formal education, say, the investment in training necessary for the long-tenure dis-
placed to cover their earnings shortfall is staggering, perhaps an order of magnitude higher 
than any such investments in the past. With any important role for self-selection into training 
based on returns,29 and with the possibility of diminishing returns to training at an individual 
level, training may not solve the problem of displacement.
Concluding Remarks
 
The robust conclusion of this paper is that training of displaced workers is not a panacea. Job 
search assistance is the single adjustment mechanism that appears to pass clear cost-beneﬁ  t 
tests in terms of earnings replacement across a range of studies, and even in this case, there 
are still doubts about general equilibrium effects if the assisted merely substitute for the un-
assisted. For training schemes beyond Jacobson et al., though, the broad sweep of results is 
much less sanguine. In limited cases and for particular displaced populations, training that was 
technically oriented has yielded returns on a par with those typically found in the literature on 
formal education, that is to say, returns in the high single digits. But given such returns, and the 
size and duration of earnings losses following displacement, the level of investment in training 
needed to bridge these gaps fully would be huge. Moreover, with allowance for selection into 
training, and if returns to training for any individual are diminishing, existing estimates of the 
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the full displacement earnings shortfall. Although training might be a good investment even 
without complete compensation, existing calculations suggest that substantial foregone earn-
ings might undercut such internal rate of return assessments for many displaced workers.
One general lesson from this review is the importance of building evaluation strategies into 
policy programs. Much earlier Canadian work did not have such assessments in place, and 
hence has yielded little in terms of robust conclusions. But the US experience is quite clear in 
showing the beneﬁ  ts of such evaluation and the problems that can arise in its absence.
A second conclusion is to raise the issue of the goal of training programs. Based on long-term 
calculations, where earnings losses in reemployment trump more transitory losses from peri-
ods of nonemployment, almost all of the evaluative literature in economics has addressed the 
extent of earnings replacement. If a major goal of policy is the short-run, however, then more 
attention needs to be paid to jobless durations following displacement and to the probability of 
reemployment, regardless of the salary and terms that such employment might offer.
 
Finally, these problems with training effectiveness prompt serious consideration of alternative 
means of compensating the losers from economic adjustment. Such steps might include modi-
ﬁ  ed or expanded EI coverage, even without any link to training expenditures. Current policies 
base eligibility only on recent work history, although displaced worker earnings often decline 
in the ﬁ  nal year or two prior to displacement from the long-term employer. Obviously, a longer 
time frame for EI work histories might beneﬁ  t such displaced workers. Moreover, the duration 
of EI may not be sufﬁ  cient to assist the displaced following a separation. Indeed, if earnings 
losses are permanent, no temporary EI framework can really meet this need. It is for these 
types of reasons that many have proposed serious evaluation of a Wage Insurance (WI) pro-
gram for the long-tenure displaced.30 Such a program would raise new challenges, and perhaps 
some sort of pilot or demonstration of WI would be appropriate. Certainly, since evidence on 
training programs for displaced workers gives quite limited promise, it is important to search 
for other creative ways to ensure that the costs of economic restructuring do not fall dispropor-
tionately on a narrow group.Mowat Centre EI Task Force 18
Endnotes
1.  See, e.g., the sequences of papers using the DWS by Farber (1993, 1998, 2004, 2005).
2.  Canada had one DWS in 1986, covering separations in the period 1981-85. 
3.  Morisette et al. also supply ﬁ  gures for those aged 50-64, a group they omitted from their analysis for 
fear of confounding issues of non-participation. Nonetheless, this older sample yields similar results. 
Rates of layoff and displacement are close to those for the prime-aged group and the relative magni-
tude of layoffs, narrow deﬁ  nition displacement and broad deﬁ  nition displacement is also consistent 
for the 50-64 year olds (2007, Appendix Table 1).
4.  Average earnings changes include individuals who experienced an earnings increase, as well as those 
who suffered a loss. Excluding those who gained, the average loss across just the set of losers would 
naturally be higher. This might be important for policies toward displacement that target only those 
that experience losses.
5.  If displacements are restricted to ﬁ  rm closure, then a qualiﬁ  cation from Morisette et al. is that these 
type of earnings losses hold for the full sample (i.e., for all tenure levels) provided the model is esti-
mated using only ﬁ  xed-effects. However, when person-speciﬁ  c trends are also included, estimated 
earnings losses become insigniﬁ  cantly different from zero more than three years after displacement.
6.  If older individuals with large potential earnings losses withdraw from the labour force, the exclu-
sion of retirees would underestimate displacement earnings losses. But if long-tenured older work-
ers have the best options for early retirement, they may leave the labour force even if potential earn-
ings losses from displacement are small; this could lead to an overestimate of displacement earnings 
loss.
7.  The heterogeneity would be unobserved to the researcher, but observed by the market participants. 
For example, ﬁ  rms could potentially retain unusually good workers, leading to long tenure positively 
correlated with high wages.
8.  It is also possible that social beneﬁ  ts to training might exceed the private gains. The costs of dis-
placement might be geographically concentrated in particular communities or regions, leading to 
multiplier-type effects that could compound individual displacement losses. Training could perhaps 
reduce reliance on EI and income assistance, and perhaps training can have wider effect in reduc-
ing illegal activity, increasing community participation and so on. On balance, though, I think the 
displacement or substitution effect is likely the most important quantitatively. 
9.  In addition to Carneiro and Heckman (2002), key papers that argue against an important role for 
borrowing constraints include Cameron and Heckman (2001), Keane and Wolpin (2002) and Cam-
eron and Taber (2004). Contrary evidence in favour of borrowing constraints is presented by Kane 
(1996) and Ellwood and Kane (2000). More broadly on the issue of credit and liquidity constraints 
and their empirical importance, see Jappelli (1990) and Souleles (2000).
10.  A recent Canadian example might be the “Learn$ave” experiment conducted by SRDC that subsi-
dized saving for approved education or training (or for small business start-up costs). See Leckie et 
al. (2009).
11.   More generally, when treatment is non-binary, one can only observe one level of treatment for a 
given individual.
12.  For example, Heckman and Smith (2004) decompose participation in a social program into ﬁ  ve 
stages: eligibility, awareness, application, acceptance and enrollment. At which stage(s) should we 
randomize?
13.  Heckman et al. (2000) provide a detailed empirical account of substitution and dropout bias, ad-
dressing the situation where control group members can ﬁ  nd substitutes for the training program, 
and where treatment group members can drop out of the training program if they ﬁ  nd a better alter-
native. Evidence suggests that classroom training was particularly vulnerable to these effects, while 
on-the-job training (with public subsidy) was less affected owing to a lack of ready substitutes.
14.  A valuable account of this debate is provided by Glazerman et al. (2003) who assess 12 studies of 
earnings impacts that sought to replicate experimental evaluation using nonexperimental methods.
15.  Note, though, that the results from evaluations of training for disadvantaged populations are also 
quite pessimistic.
16.  A valuable overview of the work on dislocated workers in the US is provided by the survey of Wand-
ner (2010).
17.  There were very few women in the Houston sample.
18.  Perhaps this pattern of results highlights Heckman’s general point that there is a limit to the ques-
tions that can be well answered by single randomization designs when the question of interest is 
multi-stage in nature. The Effectiveness of Training for Displaced Workers with Long Prior Job Tenure 19
19.  Workers also had to be attached to the state labour force between 1987 and 1995 to qualify for this 
sample.
20.  This is analogous to labour supply estimation, where one can estimate an hours-wages relationship 
using only participants with positive hours, but where efﬁ  ciency can be gained by additionally using 
non-participant data. 
21.  Similarly, Heckman et al. (2007) suggest as a summary that an additional year of formal schooling 
might raise earnings by about 10%. With adjustment for the full costs of education, this translates 
into an internal rate of return of the order of 7%.
22.  The high value of “just showing up” in JLS’s results contrasts with evidence of credential or “sheep-
skin” effects in the literature on formal education, where returns to education are estimated to be 
large only if key phases are completed and a credential achieved (for Canadian evidence, see Ferrer 
and Riddell, 2002). If Community College training is truly analogous to formal education, this appar-
ent discrepancy probably reinforces the interpretation that the JLS “just showing up” effect is driven 
by misspeciﬁ  cation.
23.  Older workers may anticipate more difﬁ  culty in course completion and may hence choose not to 
enroll. That is, the success rate is based on the self-selection sample of those that did enroll.
24.  This may also apply to earnings gains from higher wage rates if trainees crowd out non-trainees for a 
ﬁ  xed set of higher wage jobs.
25.  Interestingly, Decker (2009, p24) notes that the preliminary nonexperimental results from the WIA 
actually suggest somewhat better results for the adult program as a whole—with modestly increased 
earnings and employment for both men and women—than for the dislocated worker group. 
26.  Other nonexperimental work on the WIA include that of the US General Accounting Ofﬁ  ce, which 
noted that “Little is known on a national level about the outcomes of those being trained” (GAO, 
2005, p1), and Moore and Gorman (2009), which studied one California WIA program using regres-
sion methods and found very weak labour market beneﬁ  ts. 
27.  See also the descriptive accounts contained in the various reports by HRDC (1995, 1996a, 1996b and 
1999).
28.  Riddell, a member of the Expert Panel on Older Workers, recently commented that “Evaluation of 
these programs (which are generally of poor quality) are not encouraging: results range from disap-
pointing to dismal” (2009, p14).
29.  Kambourov et al. (2009, 2010) assess the importance of selection in a relative assessment of govern-
ment and ﬁ  rm-sponsored training, arguing that occupation switchers tend to select into govern-
ment-sponsored programs. Since switchers lose some speciﬁ  c human capital, assessment of the 
returns to public training must take this selection process into account.
30.  Some of the issues relating to Wage Insurance are discussed in the Expert Panel on Older Workers 
(2008) and in Jones (2009).
Glossary of Acronyms
COEP    Canadian Out of Employment Panel
CT   Classroom  Training
DWS    Displaced Worker Survey
EI   Employment  Insurance
JSA    Job Search Assistance
JTPA    Job Training Partnership Act
LWF    Longitudinal Worker File
OJT    On the Job Training
TIOW   Targeted Initiative For Older Workers
WAD    Worker Adjustment Demonstration
WI   Wage  Insurance
WIA    Workforce Investment ActMowat Centre EI Task Force 20
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